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There is a short story by the famous Argentine author, Jorge Luis Borges, of a civilization possessed
of a holy book. The book must, at all costs, be protected and preserved for the future. It is encased 
within a dark and mighty sarcophagus to ensure its safety from quote “humidity, heat, damp, cold, 
ice, fire, wind, rain, snow, sleet, prying fingers, hard stares, the gnawing of rats, sonic 
disintegration, the dribbling of infants, and the population at large” end quote. The special caste of 
custodians in the story – a kind of priesthood of knowledge – are confident that they can protect the 
book; especially from this last and most damaging group, the population at large. Indeed, as time 
goes by and greater swathes of this growingly democratic population request access to the book, the
priesthood formulate ever-more contrived rationales for the protection of the artefact. The intrinsic 
value of the book, to use a term from the report that forms the basis of today’s symposium, seems, 
in the story, to be increased by its scarcity of access, even as its instrumental value to society grows 
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lesser by the day. For even the priesthood do not really know or understand the contents of the book
that they guard. They have only the peripheral metadata context within which to work: the 
sacredness of the artefact, but also the sacredness of the notion of preservation. As preservation 
becomes an end in itself for the priesthood, the barbarian populace eventually overwhelm the 
fortification and prise open the sacred sarcophagus. The story draws to a close as the lay tribes 
examine the holy book, over the corpses of the priesthood, to find that it is written in a language and
script that is completely indecipherable and that has been lost to time; as meaning has eroded over 
the span of artefactual preservation.
Borges, of course, never actually wrote such a story. But he could have and it did sound 
vaguely plausible as a transparent allegory of the phenomenon under discussion today. Namely: 
what is the tension between, and the resolution of, preservation and access for non-print legal 
deposit? How is it that we have come to a situation where the path-dependence of print has so 
thoroughly conditioned the access possibilities for the digital that its most salient property – that of 
non-rivalrous dissemination – must be once more made rivalrous and discarded? And what of the 
structures of meaning that themselves naturally erode over time, like an entropic process, in the 
digital space? How, without some form of continuous access, can we ensure that we can still read 
our digitally preserved heritage over even a decadal timespan?
[SLIDE]
Perhaps a more basic question that many of you are asking, but are too polite to voice, is: why am I 
(Martin Eve) here? The simple answer to this is that I have been actively involved in attempting to 
reshape academic publication cultures in the humanities disciplines for the past decade in order to 
take advantage of digital affordances. I should also note that, as a result, my observations in this 
keynote are inflected towards the academic publishing end of the spectrum, whereas digital legal 
deposit covers artefacts from diverse sources. Most notably, I have worked on eradicating paywalls 
to humanities scholarship in the belief that it will be educationally advantageous to all societies to 
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allow the general public to read about cultures, artforms, and history for free. Along the road that I 
have travelled, I have met much resistance to this opening of access, often from those who believe, I
think wrongly, that they are thereby “defending” the humanities subjects. But I have also met 
resistance from publishers in the form of partial moves to greater access that do not fully harness 
the digital. Let me give an example. In the UK, as an attempt (in my view) to stymie the totally free 
and open consumption of research material by anyone online, The Publishers Association and 
several other bodies established an “Access to Research” pilot, in which anyone could access the 
content of research articles – for free – so long as they did so on site and in person in a library. In 
the first 19-month pilot period of “Access to Research”, the UK national total for access was 89,869
searches from 34,276 users.
That doesn’t sound so bad, you may think. But the 909 articles published or supported solely
by the platform that I run, the Open Library of Humanities, in its first year accumulated 118,686 
unique views. That is, this tiny number of open access articles were viewed by more people than a 
UK national-level pilot giving on-site access to vast quantities of subscription material across all 
disciplines over almost double the same time period. This kind of study is most often used to show 
that “very few people want to read this material, so why should an industry reconfigure its 
economics to accommodate such changes?” I think that our platform shows exactly the opposite, 
though. For this is where my interests in open access coincide with issues of user-centric thinking 
about non-print legal deposit. In a world where we can demonstrate by example that there is an 
audience for even the most abstruse types of humanities scholarship, it is becoming increasingly 
problematic to separate preservation from any kind of distributed networked access.
And an important part of this is thinking about disability; that is, opening access across 
many bounds. It is a notable feature of the white paper that existing provisions for disability in non-
print legal deposit justifiably come in for a rough ride. As a disabled academic myself who has 
vasculitis, rheumatoid arthritis, neurological hearing loss, as someone who has had a stroke and 
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pneumonia and sepsis and acute bowel dysmotility, I am very much fed up with people telling me 
that we do not need open access to monographs and articles in the humanities – or perhaps even 
elsewhere – because people can “go to a library” to access these. There are many people for whom 
“going to a library” is an extremely difficult thing to do. From those with bowel problems to those 
with Parkinson’s and a whole host in between, the reality on the ground of difficulty of physical 
access gives the lie to the intrinsic assumptions of ability by those who make such claims. I could 
not “go to the library” to read academic books when I spent most of March 2019 in hospital, despite
the fact that I was still mentally alert enough to conduct academic work. So while it is heartening to 
hear of voluntary arrangements to get around the poorly worded exceptions only for those with 
visual impairments in non-print legal deposit, it is clear that nobody’s rights were ever really 
respected by voluntary arrangements. A user-centric model of access, to legal deposit artefacts, or 
indeed to any kind of contemporary artefact in a library, must consider what it means to insist on 
embodied user presence in an era of potentially digital access. For it is this insistence that causes the
disability, by disabling entire groups from being able to conduct research. Users is not a 
homogeneous group, but a set of intersecting identity formations that require accommodation; of 
which digital dissemination is merely one aspect.
[SLIDE]
Fundamentally, though, what we are dealing with when we deal with non-print legal deposit 
and the difficulties put up in order to access this archive is, in my view, the history of keeping ideas 
scarce. We do so in order to bestow an economic quality (scarcity and value) onto a fundamentally 
non-economic concept (an idea). How are ideas non-economic? Namely: that they are not rivalrous.
Like stories, music, and other forms that we have come to call “intellectual property”, ideas can be 
transmitted from one person to another without the original owner having to lose anything. This 
stands in stark contrast to material objects, which must be rescinded upon their transfer. Material 
5/16
objects, as such, have a scarcity function embedded within them; each can exist only at one place 
and time. Ideas, on the other hand, do not.
Digital objects are a lot like ideas, although not identical. Although they rest upon the 
materiality – and therefore scarcity – of material infrastructures (hard drives, computer monitors, 
processors etc.) they give the appearance of unlimited worldwide replication in an instant, without 
the original owner losing his or her version. That is, the digital appears nonrivalrous. To encode an 
idea within a digital form gives the first moment in human history where the form could do justice 
to the content.
The problem always was, and still is: how does one make ideas and digital objects 
economic, in the sense of scarcity? One much-touted recent solution – although it’s rarely billed as 
such – is the blockchain. The blockchain can work as a “currency” because it puts a requirement of 
cryptographic work – a scarce resource – on the verification of transactions. This is a technical 
solution to a technical problem – although it comes with its own technical problems, most notably 
the question of who will be left to spend bitcoin after its astronomical power consumption has 
accelerated global warming to the point of human annihilation.
The social “solution” to this problem of non-economic forms is copyright and patents, the 
former of which protects expression and the latter of which protect ideas. Copyright as it exists 
today in most jurisdictions offers the twofold protections of economic and moral rights. This is 
usually now recognised as a time-limited monopoly on an expression in order to reward original 
creativity. In the contemporary world of academic publishing, the common rationale that publishers 
give for demanding copyright transfer or exclusive assignment is that they have invested labour in 
the production of the article and should, therefore, be able uniquely to benefit from selling that 
article during the term of copyright.
[SLIDE]
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But John Willinsky draws attention, I think brilliantly, to a most curious aspect of the origins
of modern copyright. The common legal touchstone to which most histories of copyright point is 
the 1710 Statute of Anne. This enshrined the first copyright term – a mere 28 years, trivial by 
today’s standards of the author’s life plus seventy years – in law. It was also implemented in order 
to incentivize the production of works. BUT, of critical importance, I think, following Willinsky, is 
that the Statute of Anne is titled, in brief, “An Act for the Encouragement of Learning”. In the 
history of implementing copyright, learning holds a special place and is to be encouraged. Over 
time, the centrality of learning and its importance has been lost from our understanding of copyright
– as, I often fear, has the notion that copyright is time limited and designed for the eventual 
decommissioning of exclusive right of expression to the public domain. Yet learning was central to 
copyright’s initial establishment.
Legal deposit is a mechanism that recognises the importance of learning, of cultural 
heritage, of archival records and of building that archive, even when it has to operate under limiting 
conditions of nationalism in a world where learning and culture are now global. The question is: 
does it recognise the encouragement of learning, or merely the fetishisation of an abstract learning, 
conducted by nobody, upon material inside a black sarcophagus to which no-one really has 
meaningful access?
Furthermore, the assumptions behind some of the protections of legal deposit do not make 
great sense in an open-access world. The first is the question of what it means to publish something.
The second is the fact that there is no provision for more liberal access and licensing built in to non-
print legal deposit. I want to turn briefly to each of these.
The usual, overly simplistic definition that is given to “publication” is “the act of making 
public”. Michael Bhaskar sufficiently problematises this, I think, though, when he asks whether it is
really “publishing” a work to leave a single copy of it, say, [SLIDE] on a park bench. This would, 
in all senses fulfil the definition of “making public”, but it is a pretty questionable basis on which to
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say that a work was “published”. Bhaskar instead re-defines publishing as the combined threefold 
functions of filtering, framing and amplification. In this way, publishing becomes not an act that 
pertains to the availability of the work, but instead is about the labour functions that are undertaken.
Does this context cross over into the digital domain? Certainly, Clay Shirky has told us that, 
in the digital world, the labour of publishing is, instead, a button. Yet what does it mean in a fire-
and-forget culture to return to this notion of “making public” as being akin to “publishing”? For the 
functions of filtering, framing, and amplification are now widely dispersed among many different 
entities. For instance, consider the act of filtering. What or who is the gatekeeper in a world of 
digital self-publishing? In our digital world, discoverability is provided by third-party black boxes, 
like Google, who help us to sift through vast quantities of material (obviously with a degree of self-
interest in so doing). This is not strictly what Bhaskar means by “filtering” – which he thinks of as a
gatekeeping function on the publishing side. But if one is able simply to make available one’s own 
material, then the idea of filtering becomes much more closely tied to discoverability. Filtering is 
needed by users – but after the fact. Indeed, these sifting (filtering) services are now also 
indistinguishable from various amplifcatory functions; with paid placements and so forth, it is 
difficult to amplify except by separation from the otherwise indistinguishable haystack. For a fee, 
Google will give honed magnets to one’s readers, with which they might extract your needle.
Where this perhaps gets most interesting, though, is in the notion of framing. Non-print legal
deposit brings a new slant to the framing of born-digital and digitally-published objects. For it 
confers a legitimacy upon such objects that gives them a parity, at least of sorts, with their previous 
print counterparts. Indeed, the frame reads: this work is significant enough to be preserved for 
posterity. In a world in which many remain sceptical of the digital – believing it to be ephemeral 
(although have you ever tried getting something you want removed off the web?) – this legitimation 
function should not be overlooked as a significant publication feature; albeit, again, devolved away 
from an active publication agent.
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To return to my earlier point, though, it also confers upon the digital object an economic 
quality. Most acts of free online web publishing – including, say, the formal versions of open-access
academic publishing, which include peer review etc. – have the de-economizing functions of open 
indefinite and free dissemination. Yet, as today’s report notes, in the non-print legal deposit system, 
articles that we publish at the Open Library of Humanities are restricted to on-site access by a single
patron. We have no way to signal an exception that we want broader dissemination of this work 
than the assumed economic default of rivalry. Indeed, one of the instrumental values that the current
system of non-print legal deposit forces upon works is an economic scarcity. It presumes that one 
wishes to sell the work and that this is the publication and authorship rights that must be protected. 
Yet, I query whether this is actually the case in the digital world. It seems more likely, to me, that 
the publishing industry will move to become a supply side and distributed / unbundled / 
disaggreagated set of services – as it already is in the world of academic publishing. Certainly, one 
might still wish to protect certain author rights – say those who write fiction. But there are also 
categories of authors for whom the prime motivation is to be read, rather than to sell – and these 
two phenomena are in tension with one another.
Or, at least, that’s the theory. Of course, just because the digital world seems to effect a de-
economization for dissemination doesn’t mean that society has kept pace. We still operate in a 
world run on the exchange of material artefacts (which are scarce), mediated by human structures of
finance. That said, some economic models are better suited to the digital world than others. Namely:
systems of patronage make unlimited online dissemination compatible with the digital world. There 
are some good examples of this. Patreon, for instance, is a system whereby “fans” can purchase 
recurring monthly “memberships” in order to support an artist or writer or any other type of 
“content provider”, as the comedian Stewart Lee might humorously term them. The Guardian 
newspaper made a similar move in recent years where, despite all its content being free online, it 
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has managed to solicit enough voluntary contributions from those who wish to support it to break 
even, from a previously dire financial situation.
Such models are prone to free riders; those who will not pay because they realise they can 
gain access without so doing. Sometimes these models provide exclusive perks to members in order
to entice them to continue to pay. Sometimes, they simply point out that, if all consumers were free-
riders, the producer would not be able to exist and they can thereby solicit contributions from more 
ethical audiences.
[SLIDE]
Academics, though, are in an interesting category here. In the UK, academic research is 
funded via a number of streams, one of the most significant of which is the quality-related (QR) 
funding dispensed by Research England through the Research Excellence Framework (REF). This 
comes from the public purse (“taxpayer money”), but academics are paid their salaries in order to 
produce research work to which they own the copyright and that they are free to give away to 
whichever publisher they choose. This is one of the most compelling and frequently cited arguments
for open access; academics are paid by the public, so why should the public not be able to read the 
work that they fund? Of course, many academics do not have full-time, permanent jobs and are 
precariously placed. But academics of any ilk are very unlikely ever to be able to raise enough 
money through the sale of their work to earn a living – after all, what is the market for “T cell 
receptor antagonist peptides are highly effective inhibitors of experimental allergic 
encephalomyelitis”? This is an authorship group who write to be read rather than writing to sell. It 
is, in some ways, a freedom from the market that allows the academic freedom to investigate niche 
topics. This remains, I believe, a good rationale for open access.
This category of patronage-driven authors might be willing to pay Google, or other “new 
publisher-like” services, for amplification and filtering services that tip in their favour, so that 
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readers can access and discover their material for free. But the underlying assumption of how digital
legal deposit should work for such authors is badly skewed. These authors do not want the re-
economization of their works. They want information to be free, as the now-old adage goes. There 
is, beneath non-print legal deposit, as it currently stands, a specific set of economic assumptions 
about authorship that held mostly in the non-digital realm. It is the economic scarcity correlation.
Yet, if policymakers have seemingly misunderstood the new digital context – or have rather 
simply been constrained by path-dependency of print – authors often misunderstand the nature of 
digital preservation. As above, many believe digital preservation to be a technical problem. They 
say: “look at format degradation and look at link rot – digital resources do not have the stability of 
print”. Yet, as Kathleen Fitzpatrick reminds us in her excellent book Planned Obsolescence, the 
reason that print endures is not due to any inherent quality of permanence, but rather due to the fact 
that we have invested in institutions called libraries and people called librarians whose role it is to 
ensure that permanence. [SLIDE] This echoes the thoughts of the well-known digital preservation 
expert David S. H. Rosenthal (DSHR), who has noted that the problems of digital preservation are 
all socio-economic problems. That is, with infinite resources, one could preserve any and all kinds 
of digital object forever. Because you’d have someone whose job it was, every day, to ensure that 
you could access the digital object. And if it didn’t work, they would fix the underlying problem. 
(And, by the way, the most common argument levelled against digital preservation by those who are
new to it is: “what about an apocalyptic failure of the electricity grid?” I hate to break it to you, but 
if that fails, there are bigger problems for the entirety of the world’s knowledge, which relies on 
temperature and humidity controlled storage, for instance.)
More specifically, though, the problem is the economic correlation between scarcity of 
provision and a belief, in the digital realm, that we can and should collect, store, and preserve 
everything. Part of this attitude comes from a Silicon Valley technical solutionist mentality. 
Google’s corporate mission to “organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible 
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and useful” has become the de facto universal standard against which serious digital information 
initiatives are meant to compete. But Google is a terrible advocate for digital preservation in many 
ways. [SLIDE] Not only does it perpetuate the myth that preservation is a purely technical problem,
but it is also guilty, continually, of shuttering no-longer profitable services that it cannot continue to 
maintain, but upon which userbases depend. “The world’s information” is discarded by Google and 
made neither accessible nor useful when they will no longer maintain various applications. 
Somehow, though, this apparently doesn’t count because, they will say, it is not a technical problem 
– “just” one of resourcing. But that problem of resourcing is the central problem of digital 
preservation.
In other words, even while we often base our presuppositions around digital preservation on 
a technical mentality promoted by Google, even this organization understands that it is a principle 
of economic selectivity or, as I have returned to multiple times already, scarcity, that drives what we 
can preserve. Again, this can be considered in a ratio. Objects that are abundant are likely to remain 
accessible. PDF files, for instance, are so widely used that the effort of employing someone whose 
job it remains to ensure the readability of this openly specified format is a very high objects to 
people ratio. By contrast, the custom format that I have invented for storing my own data and that is
used only by two people worldwide, for a fictional example, has a much higher ratio of investment 
for preservation.
And this is where we can come back to Bhaskar’s notion of the importance of filtering in 
publication. When there is some form of material constraint on publication – say, the overhead and 
unit costs of printing, distribution fees, warehousing, author advances, legal costs, and so forth – 
there is an economic filter built in to the publication process. This doesn’t mean that nonsense 
wasn’t published, just rather that only people with money they were willing to spend could publish 
nonsense. In the current digital environment, though, many of these unit costs can be eradicated – 
the costs inhere in cost to first copy. Different types of publishers will invest different levels of 
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effort in creating that first copy. Academic publishers who organize peer review, copyedit, typeset, 
proofread, and digitally preserve their titles actually have most of the same costs as they would 
otherwise. Less reputable publishers who do not undertake such tasks, though, can still claim to 
have “published” material, but they encounter fewer economic checks on the volume that they 
publish.
Legal deposit then picks up the pieces of this twofold attitudinal approach: that we must 
preserve everything and that more and more can be published. Yet, delving deeper into this attitude 
of what we should preserve – and whether it is “everything” – is worth some of our time today.
I want to consider here the case of retractions from the scholarly record. When a piece of 
scientific work has been shown to be incorrect, unethical, fraudulent, or otherwise inadmissible, the 
standard procedure at an academic journal is to issue a retraction. That is, the piece is clearly 
marked as “struck from the record” in order to show that it should no longer be cited or considered 
valid. Usually, it is still possible to read such work, it’s just that it is marked as retracted.
Is this work that we want to preserve? Do we want our national deposit libraries to ingest 
work that is incorrect, unethical, or fraudulent? I think it actually depends upon whom you ask. 
Consider the example of Andrew Wakefield’s notorious paper on MMR. The overwhelming 
consensus in the medical profession is that this paper has done immeasurable harm and that the anti-
vaxx movement is now single-handedly responsible for the return of preventable and extremely 
dangerous diseases in nonetheless economically developed countries. I haven’t run a survey, but I 
would anticipate that many in the medical sector would suggest that this paper should not be 
preserved for posterity. However, if you ask a historian of science whether this work should be 
preserved, the answer will absolutely be a “yes”. For how else are we to understand the societal 
contexts and histories of the anti-vaccination movement without access to the original source 
materials? There are very different instrumental use cases for the same material here, one based on 
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appraising the truth of the work (at which it fails) and the other based on a historicizing and 
contextual approach that values its falsehood.
Perhaps another good example of this is to be found in the field of software and digital 
document preservation. Certain types of document – such as Microsoft Word files – can be 
vulnerable to worms, viruses, and other forms of malware, usually encoded within their macro 
procedures. Should we preserve these malicious artefacts along with the document itself? Again, it 
depends upon whom you ask. The person who wants to read the original document, without the 
threat of damage to the computer system on which they are viewing the object, would probably 
prefer a cleaned-up version of the file (although who is going to do this cleaning up? This is likely, 
again, a lot of work in the context of rare or long-forgotten malware). On the other hand, the 
historian of computing might precisely want to study those viruses and malware and how they 
functioned within the document-object’s historical context. Value for preservation is in the eye of 
the beholder and I would argue that it is very difficult for us to predict, in advance, which 
phenomena will be wanted by future unknown audiences.
[SLIDE]
Thus, despite my scepticism, I come to a “preserve everything” conclusion, even while 
noting the absolute economic untenability of that stance. We must select what to preserve in the 
present – and that includes the twofold functions of storage and making accessible – and we must 
consciously select what to discard. History will likely judge us poorly for our decisions to discard, 
but the contemporary economic principles do not offer us the option of keeping everything 
accessible, even if they do give us the possibility of storing everything. But, as with those who opt 
to be frozen upon their death here in the present, there is no guaranteed possibility of future 
resurrection for our stored artefacts, without continuous accessibility checking.
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There are also questions of retroactive subject permissions that circle around this mentality 
of preserving everything. Istvan Rev tells of the problematic situation he faced in his archive of 
material on the Rwanadan Genocide. A previously broadcast clip from a BBC documentary featured
a woman who incriminated herself on camera – thereby putting herself at great personal risk – who 
then retrospectively requested that she be removed from the footage. The material had, again, 
already been broadcast (one could call this analogous to publication). However, there is a 
substantial difference between a one-off broadcast and open, unlimited, online dissemination of the 
same footage. How does one balance these matters of delicate personal consent, data controller 
issues in the era of GDPR and the “right to be forgotten”, and even the potential harm of these 
subjects against the need to create an archive of material for posterity, and an archive that must, in 
some way or another, be accessible.
This brings us back, full circle, to these matters of open access to national non-print legal 
deposit. Is it a difference of type, or degree, to have only on-site access to preserved materials. Let 
us say, in the above case, that the archive refused to remove the video for the sake of history, but 
permitted only on-site, rather than on-line, access. How would one feel, in terms of personal safety, 
being that woman? Could one imagine selective restriction of access to certain materials? What 
about embargoes? Of course, this runs the risk of the Streisand effect, calling attention to the very 
thing that one wishes to bury, once more, in that haystack.
This is a little bit of a straw-person argument in some ways, though. The challenge with 
high-volume archives such as the UK Web Archive and the non-print legal deposit system is not 
hiding material, it’s finding it. Google does a good job of retrieving the information that most users 
want through a combination of weighted linking algorithms and assumptions of social homogeneity 
among users. The first of these is the famed PageRank method, in which sites confer “votes” for 
each other through hyperlinks. Sites that have already been ranked more highly carry more weight 
when they link to other sites. This then creates a chain of value among documents and creators. It 
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also led to the humorous GoogleBombing phenomenon whereby one can attempt to influence a 
search term by generating a horde of sites that all link to a particular artefact using the same term. 
This is partially but not wholly why a search for “idiot” returned a picture of Donald Trump. The 
second phenomenon that Google exploits is an assumption that users look for the same things. This 
can be helpful. If most people click a specific link in relation to a particular search term, then it is 
likely that this is a high-quality response that should be prioritised in future searches. The problem, 
as Safiya Noble has expertly shown in her Algorithms of Oppression: How Search Engines 
Reinforce Racism, is that this can lead to racist, sexist, ableist, homophobic, transphobic, and other 
discriminatory categories being condoned as worthy of higher placement, merely because a subset 
of users search using these terms.
This aside, how do we imagine that this might work in an academic-archival setting? 
Citation parsing and inter-reference calculation are extremely difficult in a free-text environment. In
XHTML, with which Google primarily deals, you have a very well-formed structure for linking that
we know how to parse. References, academic or otherwise, in a massive free-text corpus are far 
harder to parse computationally. Let us say that I have referenced a Borges short story in this paper. 
Except I didn’t, I referenced a made-up Borges short story. Our computational natural language 
parsing is not good enough to work out that this is a reference to a fictional, non-existent text. This 
causes us substantial difficulties if we want to weight return results by documents that reference 
other documents, in a totally free-text fashion.
Secondly, at present, we don’t have a huge userbase for the non-print legal deposit archive; 
because it is on-site only. This means that we have a very specific subset of users who are working 
with this archive and they are unlikely to represent a broader population. In other words, we have a 
situation in which, if we prioritise discoverability by the current userbase, we are hardly reflecting a
broader potential grouping. We also need to ask how helpful this is in the context of a historical 
archive. People are often, in such contexts, searching for the rare and exceptional, not the same 
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thing as everyone else. All of this poses huge problems for discoverability within a system of non-
print legal deposit.
[SLIDE]
Ultimately, though, and here is where I want to begin to conclude: it is easy to feel 
pessimistic about the prospects for the collection, preservation, and ongoing access to our digital 
cultural heritage. We have mindsets conditioned by print path dependency and a simultaneous 
culture of universal preservation coupled to place-restricted access. We are not sure what we need to
preserve, so we opt to think that the answer should be “everything”, without thinking through the 
resource implications of this in the present and the future. We have heterogeneous user categories 
who want different things from an archive; some, seeking truth, others seeking contextual falsehood
for historical understanding. We have needles and haystacks, with very few effective magnets.
Yet these unanswered queries, these unresolved questions are why I feel that today’s report –
on user-centric evaluation of the UK Non-Print Legal Deposit – is a valuable frame. For we do not 
want, to return to my non-Borges short story, to end up with The Sacred Unreadable Artefact. We 
must think beyond the theology of the gatekeeping priesthood, beyond the economics of print 
scarcity, and beyond the false idealism of digital abundance, to consider the fundamental question: 
for whom is legal deposit designed? If the answer is “nobody” – or if we cannot identify a 
substantial audience – then, I would suggest, we have a far bigger problem.
